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Article 11

THE DARK DAYS OF DECEMBER
By Nathan W. Dickerson
David Hackett Fischer’s book Washington’s Crossing, published in
2004, focuses on the days leading up to and following the Battle of Trenton
and reveals the battle’s importance in the creation of the United States.
Fischer’s goal in writing Washington’s Crossing is to shine a new light on the
revival of the American cause in the days leading up to the battle and to
highlight the overall importance this relatively small engagement had on the
larger picture of American independence.
Fischer’s theory revolves around a belief that the choices and events
that had occurred previous to the battle set the stage for it to be a major
turning point in the war. In the opening portion of Washington’s Crossing,
Fischer uses the book to show his readers where both armies were, physically
and mentally, leading up to the battle in December of 1776. Fischer
particularly emphasizes the low morale of Washington’s army after the many
defeats in the New York campaign. At this stage of the war, it appeared as if
Washington’s army would not be destroyed by the British, but rather by the
New Year and the end of his men’s enlistments.1
Fischer highlights key points that would come into effect as the
Battle of Trenton drew nearer. He alludes to the confusion and lack of
organization in the Colonial army in the months leading up to the Battle of
Trenton during the New York campaign. He shows how faulty intelligence
played a major role in Washington’s tactical mistakes in battle. On the other
side of the battlefield, Fischer relates General Howe’s conservative strategy
to the underwhelming success of Washington’s army by pointing out that
Howe’s strategy was preventing Washington from maximizing on the
strengths of his army in a manner that would give him the upper hand.2
A stirring began amongst the American people in December 1776,
as Washington’s army sat opposite the British Army on the banks of the
Delaware River. This stirring was trigged by the words of a man named
Thomas Paine. Thomas Paine, the author of Common Sense, the pamphlet
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that brought the Continental Congress to the doorstep of declaring
independence triggered this stirring by writing another pamphlet. This
pamphlet, American Crisis, pushed Congress one step closer to freedom. 3
Paine’s message in American Crisis called for the spirit present at the battles
of Lexington and Concord to rise up again and take arms against the British
tyrants. This call to arms created a spark that would ignite an impassioned
fervor throughout the American movement.
It is here that Fischer reveals the missing piece of American folklore
from the winter of 1776. Fischer relates that while the battle on Christmas
day become the turning point of the war, it was the revival of the
revolutionary spirit in days prior that would allow Washington to seize
momentum and charge forward.4 The Continental Congress saw a need to
change of direction of the war. Until this point, Congress intervened in the
everyday operations of the war, and by doing so, greatly hindered
Washington’s ability to control his army. Congress created the concept of
civilian oversight with military command to correct this problem.5 This gave
Washington the ability to run the Army in a way that better fit the method in
which he was going to command it. It was because of these changes that a
new national army was formed.6 A few months prior to Trenton, Congress
gave Washington permission to raise new forces. Now, with the changes
made to the structure of the army by Congress and with Americans across the
Colonies feeling the urgency presented by Paine, the ranks grew and morale
shifted.7 Washington restructured his army then reformed it in a manner
which that provided better organization and stronger leadership then had been
present in the New York campaign. Out of the defeat and chaos of the New
York campaign rose a desperation that revived the Revolution. Now
Washington needed an opportunity to capitalize on this new fervor and
solidify the American cause.
In mid-December, Washington began forming a plan. Drawing on
the enemy intelligence his spies provided him, Washington chose to attack
the Hessian troops at Trenton, the weakest enemy outpost along the Delaware
River. On Christmas morning of 1776, Washington’s men crossed the
Delaware River. Washington’s men faced great difficulties. But due to the
3

Fischer, 140.
Ibid., 142.
5
Ibid., 143.
6
Ibid., 151.
7
Ibid., 151.
4

104

Dark Days of December
better organization and stronger leadership instituted after the New York
campaign, Washington’s soldiers remained steadfast and pushed through to
Trenton where they forced the Hessian troops to retreat and then surrender.
Washington took this victory at Trenton and capitalized on it,
turning it into a twelve-week campaign culminating in a victory at Princeton.
From these victories rose the new national army as ranks swelled and morale
soared. The revival of the revolutionary spirit leading up to Trenton did not
open the door for victory it simply gave Washington the opportunity that
General Howe had been alluding him, and he capitalized on it.
In this book, David Hackett Fischer takes an old story from the
American history books and redefines it. He provides a reason for what has
long been seen as simply a miracle, and paints an even greater picture of its
importance. Fischer defends his thesis well and backs up his points with solid
background information, especially in regard to why the Battle of Trenton
played such an important role in the outcome of the war. Fischer goes into
detail on the mindset of Washington’s army and how the revival of the
revolutionary spirit changed the course of the war. By showing the impact
that the revival of the revolutionary spirit had on the morale of the colonies,
as well as the impact it had on the physical structure of the army, Fischer
accomplishes his goal of shining a light on the days leading up to the Battle
of Trenton. Fischer effectively answers questions of how a defeated and tired
army could dismantle well-trained mercenaries, without making faulty
statements about the Hessians’ potential drunkenness as others have done.
Fischer takes a unique approach to historical writing by adding in a number
of paintings based on moments from the Battle of Trenton and Princeton as
well as maps. He even provides a lengthy appendix to help his readers better
understand his research and theory. This book would be a fascinating read for
anyone who enjoys discovering a new twist on an old story, or who loves the
adventure of a thrilling historical narrative.
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